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Abstract: In classical logic, it is evident that there is a clear relationship be-
tween the conditional, which is materially interpreted, and the universally 
quantified sentences. In this paper, I claim that this relationship is not only a 
requirement of that logic, but we also have important evidence that seems to 
prove that the human mind assumes it in a natural way by virtue of purely psy-
chological reasons. To show this, I resort to an ancient text authored by Sextus 
Empiricus, in which the relationship is explained in a very precise manner, and 
the framework given by a current cognitive theory, the mental models theory, 
in which descriptions of the way it appears that human beings tend to unders-
tand both conditionals and the universally quantified sentences are included.
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Resumen: En la lógica clásica, es evidente que existe una relación clara entre 
el condicional, el cual es interpretado materialmente, y las sentencias cuantifi-
cadas universalmente. En este trabajo, proponemos que tal relación no es solo 
una exigencia de esa lógica, sino que contamos también con importantes evi-
dencias que parecen probar que la mente humana la asume de manera natural 
en virtud de razones puramente psicológicas. Para mostrar esto, recurrimos 
a un texto antiguo escrito por Sexto Empírico, en el que se explica la relación 
de un modo muy preciso, y al marco ofrecido por una teoría cognitiva actual, 
la teoría de los modelos mentales, en el que se incluyen descripciones de la 
manera en que parece que los seres humanos tendemos a entender tanto los 
condicionales como las sentencias cuantificadas universalmente.
Palabras-clave: condicionales; lógica; modelos mentales; razonamiento; cuan-
tificación universal
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1. Introduction
There are different logics and the conditional is not always unders-
tood in the same way in all of them. Classical first-order predicate logic 
considers it to be material, in the sense attributed to it by Philo of Mega-
ra1, but, as it is well known, from ancient times, other manners to unders-
tand it have been proposed (remember, for example, the criterion provided 
by Chrysippus of Soli2), a relatively recent approach being, for instance, 
the one that is to be found in works such as that of Mares3. However, what 
is interesting for this paper is that it seems that classical first-order pre-
dicate logic not only interprets the conditional as a material relationship 
between the antecedent and the consequent, but also it links the condi-
tional to the universally quantified sentences. Indeed, it appears that, in 
general, in that logic, the best way to express the universal quantification 
is by means of a conditional4. Nonetheless, my main goal here is to try to 
show that this last point is not only a technical requirement of standard 
first order predicate calculus. The roots of the relationship are deeper and 
we have several proofs of that.
On the one hand, we can find passages written in ancient times 
that establish the link and state the necessity to pay attention to that rela-
tionship. One of them, for example, is the one authored by Sextus Empiri-
cus5. What is important about that passage is that, evidently, it is written 
in a time much earlier than that in which standard first-order predicate 
1. See, e.g., Bocheński, I. M.: Ancient Formal Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1963, p. 
89; or O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: “The Megarians and the Stoics” in Gabbay, D. M. 
& Woods, J.: Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1. Greek, Indian and Arabic logic. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004, p. 479.
2. See, e.g., Gould, J. B.: The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1970, p. 76; or O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: op. cit., p. 479. 
3. Mares, E. D.: Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
4. See, e.g., Deaño, A.: Introducción a la lógica formal. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1999, p. 
188. Nevertheless, any other introductory work about classical logic, such as, e.g., those of 
Fisher, J.: On the Philosophy of Logic. Belmont: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2008; or 
Restall, G.: Logic: An Introduction. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006, can also be illustrative enough.
5. Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos 11. 8-11; see, e.g., for a Spanish translation, 
Boeri, M. D. & Salles, R: Los filósofos estoicos: Ontología, lógica, física y ética. Santiago de 
Chile: Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2014, p. 84.
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logic was provided. And this is relevant because it seems to reveal that the 
relationship is more natural to the human mind than has been thought.
On the other hand, today there are firmly established theories in 
cognitive science field explicitly rejecting logical forms and logic in gene-
ral, and standard logic in particular, as the criterion to explain human 
reasoning, and implicitly accepting that relationship at the same time. 
One of these theories is, for example, the mental models theory6. What is 
interesting about this theory is that, as said, while it proposes, contrary 
to what is held by other contemporary approaches7, that no logic leads our 
inferential activity, the relationship between conditionals and the univer-
sally quantified sentences can be easily deduced based on its framework. 
Thus, the theory seems to show that, although we can ignore logical forms 
and syntactic rules to account for human reasoning, we cannot ignore that 
relationship.
All of this appears to mean that the relationship between the con-
ditional and the universal quantification is not only a distinctive charac-
teristic of standard first-order predicate calculus, but there are also clear 
psychological reasons that prove that it is essential in human cognition. 
As stated, this paper is basically intended to show that this last idea is 
correct, and, to do that, firstly, I will better explain the nature of the men-
tioned relationship in classical logic. Secondly, I will analyze the Sextus 
Empiricus’ passage indicated above in order to prove that the relationship 
was already identified in Ancient Greece. And finally I will account for 
how the mental models theory can offer more arguments to consider that 
relationship to have a psychological basis independent of the principles, 
theses, and assumptions of standard first-order predicate logic. I hence 
6. See, e.g., Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Inference with mental models” in Holyoak, K. J. & 
Morrison, R. G.: The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 134-145; Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P.: 
“Modelli mentali: Una guida facile per il profano” in Sistemi Intelligenti XI(1), 1999, pp. 63-
84; Khemlani, S., Lotstein, M., Trafton, J. G., & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Immediate inferences 
from quantified assertions” in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 68(10), 
2015, pp. 2073-2096: Quelhas, A. C. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “The modulation of disjunctive 
assertions” in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70(4), pp. 703-717.
7. For example, the mental logic theory, to which I will refer below. 
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begin with an account of the sense of the link between the conditional and 
the universally quantified sentences in this last logic.
2. The universal quantifier, the conditional, and first-order 
predicate calculus
Let us think about this universally quantified sentence:
All bears are mammals
Given this sentence, one could consider its logical structure in 
first-order predicate calculus to be akin to this one:
(x) (Bx · Mx)
Where the brackets containing x indicate that it is universally 
quantified, ‘B’ means ‘to be a bear’, ‘·’ is the logical conjunction, and ‘M’ 
corresponds to ‘to be a mammal.’
In principle, because words such as ‘if’ and ‘then’ do not appear in 
the sentence, it could be thought that this is an appropriate logical form for 
it. Nevertheless, it is not hard to note that this formalization is not correct, 
since what it states is that ‘for any x, x is a bear and x is a mammal,’ i.e., 
that all of the things, objects, and beings around the world are both bears 
and mammals.
So, there is no doubt that a better formula could be the following:
(x) (Bx → Mx)
Where ‘→’ denotes conditional relationship.
Indeed, this last formula can be read as ‘for any x, if x is a bear, 
then x is a mammal,’ which expresses much better the actual sense of the 
initial sentence.
Deaño8 explains this fact saying that all of the universal sentences 
express a connection between two predicates in such a way that all of the 
subjects of the first one are, in the same way, subjects of the second one. A 
predicate includes the other one, and to fulfill the first one is a sufficient 
condition to fulfill the second one. But the point is that this is not a finding 
of standard first-order predicate calculus. As said, in ancient times, when 
8.  Deaño, A.: op. cit., p. 188.
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this later logic had not been established yet, the relationship did have 
been noted.
3. Sextus Empiricus’ testimony on conditionals and the uni-
versal quantification
Actually, what Sextus Empiricus intends to account for in his 
passage9 is simply that definitions and the universal sentences are 
equivalent. Indeed, the passage, which is the fragment 4.6 in Boeri and 
Salles’s book10, states that definition is only different from the universal 
sentence (τοῦ καθολικοῦ, genitive) by virtue of syntax. Both of them are the 
same as far as their meaning is concerned. Two examples used by Sextus 
are:
ἄνθρω πος ἔστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν
That is, ‘a human being is a mortal rational animal.’ And
εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνο ζῷον ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν
That is, ‘if something is a human being, that is a mortal rational 
animal.’
Likewise, other two examples are the following:
τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι
That is, ‘some of the human beings are Greek and others are 
Barbarian.’ And
εἰ τινές εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἢ Ἕλληνες εἰσιν ἢ βάρβαροι
That is, ‘if there are some human beings, those are either Greek or 
Barbarian.’
The truth is that Sextus proposes a few more examples, but the 
important point here is that every sentence considered to be universal 
(καθολικόν) by him is expressed by means of a conditional including the 
word εἰ (if). In addition, he also uses with the conditionals words such 
as τί, τινές, ἐκεῖνο, and ἐκεῖνοι, which are not hard to link to the universal 
quantifier. And, as if all of this were not enough, he states that just one 
9.  Sextus Empiricus: op. cit., 11. 8-11.
10.  Boeri, M. D. & Salles, R.: op. cit., p. 93.
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negative example demonstrates that both sentences (the definition and 
the universal one) are false, that is, in the case of the examples quoted, 
that just a human being not being a mortal rational animal would prove 
that the two first sentences are not true, and that just a human being not 
being either Greek or Barbarian would demonstrate that the third one and 
the fourth one are false.
So, the relationship is absolutely evident, and it is so in a context 
that is not related to classical first-order predicate logic at all. That 
context refers to many centuries before the development of standard logic, 
and, besides, Sextus Empiricus quotes to Chrysippus of Soli, who, as it 
is well known, was an important representative of Stoicism. This fact is 
relevant because today it is clear that Stoic logic should not be reviewed 
from standard logic and that the latter is not the best criterion to assess 
the former11. Thus, all of this seems to suggest that the relationship is 
somehow natural to the human mind and that it is not only a technical 
convention of first-order predicate logic. But what is really interesting is 
that a contemporary reasoning theory, the mental models theory, appears 
to show this same idea.
4. Conditionals and the universal quantification in the men-
tal models theory
At present, the mental models theory is really a very accepted 
theory. The reason for that can be its great power to account for most 
of the results of the experiments reported in the literature using tasks 
related to reasoning or to the deduction of conclusions. However, the 
most relevant aspect of it for this paper is that it rejects the idea that 
logic plays a role in human thought. Pragmatics, semantics, and the 
meanings of sentences are important here, but not logical forms or 
syntactic rules. According to the theory, reasoning is basically compa-
rison and analysis of semantic possibilities, and not the use of formal 
schemata.
Notwithstanding the above, a very surprising point of the theory 
is that it seems to continue to keep the relationship between conditionals 
and the universal quantified sentences. To show that, I will only focus on 
the theses of the theory linked to these two kinds of sentences. I begin with 
the conditional.
In general, the theory claims that each sentence in natural langua-
ge allows certain possible scenarios. Nevertheless, a problem is that those 
11. See, e.g., Bobzien, S.: “Stoic syllogistic” in Taylor, C. C. W.: Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 134.
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possible scenarios are not always easy to detect. In the case of the condi-
tional, it can be said that there is a ‘mental model’ (a possible scenario) 
that is not difficult to identify. That mental model refers to the situation in 
which both the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional are true. 
In this way, if the sentence is, for example, ‘if A, then B,’ as indicated by 
Johnson-Laird12, its mental model would be as follows:
A   B
As said, this model represents a situation in which both A and B 
happen. Nonetheless, individuals can make more effort and detect the ‘fu-
lly explicit models’ of the sentence, i.e., all the combinations of possibilities 
to which it is related. Following Johnson-Laird13 too, such models would 
be these ones:
A   B
not-A   B
not-A   not-B
As it can be noted, two more models have been added now. In the 
second one, only the consequent (B) is true, and, in the third one, neither 
clause (antecedent or consequent) is true.
But, in this theory, the difference between easy and hard mo-
dels exists in the case of the quantified sentences as well. Maybe the 
terminology is different, but the basic thesis is very akin. Thus, in the 
particular case of a universally quantified sentence, it can be assumed 
that a first easy model including, for example, three elements can be 
this one:
A   B
A   B
A   B
According to Khemlani et al.14, this would be an example of easy 
model corresponding to an expression such as ‘all of the A are B,’ i.e., a 
‘canonical model’ of this later sentence. However, a greater effort can 
also lead to other possibilities here. In this way, with further reflection, 
12. Johnson-Laird, P. N.: op. cit., p. 138, Table 9.2.
13.  Idem.
14.  Khemlani, S., Lotstein, M., Trafton, J. G., & Johnson-
Laird, P. N.: op. cit., p. 2077, Table 1.
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a ‘noncanonical model,’ i.e., a model including more combinations of 
possibilities, can be built. The example of noncanonical model for that 
same sentence given by Khemlani et al.15 is the following:
A   B
¬A   B
¬A   ¬B
Where ‘¬’ denotes negation.
Now, the first combination is the same as those of the canonical 
model. Nevertheless, the second one represents a situation in which a B is 
not a A, which is compatible with the sentence ‘all of the A are B,’ and the 
third one stands for a scenario in which the element is neither A nor B, 
which is also compatible with that same sentence.
But the important point here is that, from these theses, it is not 
hard to note that there is a clear correspondence between conditionals and 
the universal quantification in the mental models theory. On the one hand, 
the mental model of the conditional (A and B) matches all of the cases 
considered in the canonical model of the universally quantified sentence 
(all of those cases are cases of A and B). On the other hand, the set of fully 
explicit models of the conditional (A and B, not-A and B, and not-A and 
not-B) is exactly identical to that of the possibilities of the noncanonical 
model of the universally quantified sentence (A and B, ¬A and B, and ¬A 
and ¬B). So, if the conditional relationship and the universal quantification 
refer to basically the same semantic possibilities, the link is obvious in the 
mental models theory.
Therefore, if we assume this last theory (and, as stated, we have 
interesting reasons coming from empirical evidence to do that), it can 
be said that there is a natural relationship between the conditional and 
the universal quantification. That relationship would be based on the 
human psychology and beyond the requirements of first-order predicate 
calculus.
5. Conclusions
The link hence is evident. In fact, the link could include not only 
conditionals and the universal quantified sentences, but also definitions. 
For instance, if we take one of the examples given by Sextus Empiricus in 
15.  Idem.
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his passage above16, ‘a human being is a mortal rational animal,’ is obvious 
that it could be claimed that an easy model of it could be as follows:
Human being   Mortal rational animal
Human being   Mortal rational animal
Human being   Mortal rational animal
Likewise, it could be said that, after further cognitive effort, these 
possibilities could be identified:
Human being   Mortal rational animal
¬(Human being)   Mortal rational animal
¬(Human being)   ¬(Mortal rational animal)
This means, therefore, that it can be state that not only conditionals 
and the universally quantified sentences have similar semantic models, 
but definitions also refer to the same sets of possibilities.
As said, the link between conditionals and the universal 
quantification is indisputable in classical logic, but this paper has shown 
that the relationship can be much deeper. It can be noted in Ancient 
Greece (where, as indicated, it can also be seen that the link extends to 
definitions as well), i.e., in a time in which the current standard first-order 
predicate logic has not been provided yet. Besides, as also explained, if 
a contemporary cognitive theory, the mental models theory, is assumed, 
the link between the conditional and the universally quantified sentences 
(and even, as also accounted for, definitions) must be assumed too, because 
they are related to the same combinations of possibilities.
So, all of this reveals an important point that needs to be 
considered in the debate on the problem of whether the human mind has 
any relationship of any kind to classical logic or not. It is clear that, while 
human reasoning does not follow standard logic in entirety, there can 
be certain aspects of that logic referring to basic psychological processes 
necessary to know the world and reality. The literature on cognitive science 
shows that it is evident that our mind does not usually apply many of the 
formal rules of the standard calculi (e.g., a number of works supporting 
the mental models theory such as the one of Johnson-Laird cited above17 
demonstrate that), and that, if there is a logic on the human mind, that 
cannot be its only element18. However, this fact should not be thought to 
16.  Sextus Empiricus: op. cit., 11. 8-11.
17. Johnson-Laird, P. N.: op. cit., pp. 134-145.
18.  See, e.g., López-Astorga, M.: “Mental models and syntactic rules: A study of the relations 
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mean that standard logic has nothing to do with human reasoning activity, 
since some of its rules or requirements may play a role in this last activity.
In fact, at present there are also theories claiming that our 
reasoning follows a logic, although that logic is other than the classical one. 
An example of this kind of theory is the mental logic theory19, which only 
accepts some of the formal schemata of standard propositional calculus 
without admitting completely Gentzen’s framework20. In this way, it can 
be stated that, while it is clear that the potential of the mental models 
theory is unquestionable, perhaps it makes sense to continue to research 
in this direction. It is obvious that standard logic does not describe or 
account for human reasoning, but this fact does not imply that the former 
has no relationship to the latter. One relationship is that the conditional 
and the universally quantified sentences (and definitions) are connected, 
and maybe there are more links between them.
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